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The federal government is the largest single lender in the country. As of the
end of 1988, direct loans outstanding exceeded $222 billion, while outstand-
ing loan guarantees were approximately $550 billion (Office of Management
and Budget 1989). Federal credit assists borrowers across a wide variety of
sectors, including housing, agriculture, small business, and education, in a
bewildering array of over 100 programs.
1
In order to analyze the effects of these policies, this paper focuses on two
salient characteristics of virtually all credit programs. First, federal credit is
usually intended for those who could not obtain private financing. For ex-
ample, "a direct loan is best justified when the federal objective could not be
met with financing from private sources" (Office of Management and Budget,
1988, F-15). Other programs, such as Small Business Administration loan
guarantees, require applicants to prove that they could not obtain private fi-
nancing.
Second, federal credit is provided on easier terms than comparable private
credit. These terms can include reduced interest or collateral, longer maturi-
ties, grace periods, and so on. These provisions are estimated to reduce the
discounted value of borrower payments by amounts that vary widely across
programs, but typically range between 10% and 25% (Office of Management
and Budget 1989).
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This paper analyzes the effects of policies with these characteristics in a
model where rationing arises endogenously.
2 The underlying model is de-
scribed in Section 2.2 and is closely related to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
and Besanko and Thakor (1987). Investors are divided into two groups, high
risk and low risk, and have a choice between investing in a safe project or
borrowing to invest in a risky project. For each group, lenders specify a prob-
ability of issuing a loan, an interest rate, and a collateral requirement.
Any given amount of collateral is assumed to be worth less to lenders than
to borrowers. This feature implies that the use of collateral will generate an
efficiency loss. In addition, all projects have expected gross returns greater
than their social opportunity cost. Therefore, any amount of rationing repre-
sents an additional efficiency loss. The full information equilibrium arises
when borrower type is known ex ante, implies no rationing and no collateral,
and is thus efficient.
Section 2.3 analyzes situations where each borrower's type is private infor-
mation. Now, lenders must collectively offer sets of contracts that induce bor-
rowers to self-select into the appropriate contract. In equilibrium, high risks
choose a contract with a relatively high interest rate and a zero collateral re-
quirement. Low risks signal their type by choosing to pay high collateral in
exchange for a lower interest rate. As long as low risks have sufficient wealth
to post as collateral, the equilibrium involves no rationing. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the efficiency loss created by the use of collateral, there is a potential
role for government.
The principal result of this section is to show that credit policies operate
through their effects on the incentive-compatibility constraint, which limits
the set of admissable contracts such that high-risk borrowers do not apply for
the low-risk contract. For example, a guarantee to low-risk borrowers reduces
their interest rate. Since the high-risk contract has not changed, the low-risk
collateral requirement must rise in order to restore incentive compatibility.
The increase in collateral means that guarantees to low risks reduce efficiency.
In contrast, a guarantee to high-risk borrowers makes the high-risk loan
more attractive, thereby allowing lenders to reduce the collateral requirement
on low-risk loans. Consequently, guarantees to high-risks raise efficiency.
Equal guarantees to both groups have similar negative effects on the collateral
requirement and positive effects on efficiency.
The major results of the paper are presented in Section 2.4, where it is
assumed that borrower wealth is too low to support the collateral requirement
outlined in Section 2.3. Because the high-risk contract involves no collateral,
it does not change. However, since low-risks can only post a small amount of
collateral, the low-risk contract must somehow be made less desirable in order
to restore incentive compatibility. The only option is to reduce the probability
of granting a low-risk loan; that is, to introduce rationing of low-risk bor-
rowers.
3
With the existence of rationing, it is now possible to analyze credit policies45 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
with the two salient features described above. Suppose the government agrees
to offer subsidized credit (either direct or guaranteed loans) to some propor-
tion of the (low-risk) borrowers who are turned down by the private market.
The key point is that in the absence of any further changes, these subsidies
make the low-risk contract more attractive to high-risk borrowers. Therefore,
some other aspect of the low-risk contract must become less desirable in order
to restore incentive compatibility. Since the collateral requirement cannot rise,
the only alternative is for the overall (public and private) probability of obtain-
ing a loan to fall. That is, increased subsidies to the rationed borrowers raise
the extent of rationing. Private lending is crowded out on a more than one-to-
one basis. It should be emphasized that this is an equilibrium response and is
due to the existence of the incentive-compatibility constraint.
Although the subsidies increase the extent of rationing, they raise the ex
ante expected utility of low-risk borrowers. This occurs because the benefits
of the added cheap government loans outweigh the costs of the increased
probability of being rationed. Thus, subsidies to low risks make the represent-
ative low-risk borrower better off ex ante but actually reduce the utility of
some low-risk borrowers ex post. Since they increase the extent of rationing,
the subsidies to low-risk borrowers reduce overall efficiency.
In contrast, subsidies to high-risk borrowers loosen the incentive-compati-
bility constraint. As a consequence, the extent of rationing of low-risk bor-
rowers falls and efficiency rises.
Section 2.5 offers a short conclusion. The Appendix provides derivations
of the various equilibria and proofs of the propositions.
2.2 The Basic Model
2.2.1 Description
The model describes a competitive credit market with many investors, but
even more lenders. All agents are assumed to be risk neutral, thus eliminating
any insurance role for federal credit, and there is no aggregate risk.
Investors can invest their initial endowment in a safe project that yields a
gross return of Z.
4 Alternatively, each investor can borrow $1 and invest that
and the initial endowment in a risky project. Investors fall into two categories,
which differ according to the probability of having a risky project succeed, IT.,
and the gross return to that project, if it is successful, Rr I assume TT, > TT2,
so that type l's are low-risk borrowers. Projects that do not succeed yield a
gross return of zero. The expected gross return to all projects are equal: piRi
= k, i = 1,2, where k is a constant. Investors have a certain end-of-period
endowment, W. I assume the existence of a sufficient enforcement technology
such that W is acceptable to lenders as collateral. The proportion of borrowers
that are low risk is given by cp.
Lenders have an alternative safe investment that earns p. They offer loans46 William G. Gale
characterized by an interest rate (r), a collateral requirement (c), and a proba-
bility of issuing the loan to any particular applicant (p). Following several
authors,
51 assume there is a cost to collateralization. Specifically, the lenders'
valuation of $1 in collateral is given by fJ, 0 ^ (3 < 1. Therefore, 1 — (3 > 0
represents the social cost of transferring the collateral or realizing its value.
Competition among lenders generates the following zero-profit condition on
loans to each group:
6
(1) p = ir,r. + (1 - TT,.)PC,, i = 1,2.
Investors are assumed to be able to apply for only one loan. The expected
utility of an investor in group i applying for a loan contract meant for group
7 is
(2) Ui} = pJfrfR, - r) - (1 - TT,)CJ. - Z], i,j =1,2.
Lenders always know the value of 9. In the full information equilibrium
described below, lenders also know each borrower's type. In the asymmetric
information equilibria, information on borrower type is unavailable to banks
on an ex ante basis.
The Nash equilibrium concept is used throughout this paper. A set of con-
tracts is a Nash equilibrium if, holding the current set of contracts fixed, no
contract in the set earns negative profits and there is no additional contract
which, if offered, would make positive profits (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976).
2.2.2 Full Information Equilibrium
Although subsequent analysis will focus on markets with asymmetric infor-
mation, the full information equilibrium is presented first as a benchmark.
Because the types are identifiable ex ante, lenders face two distinct loan mar-
kets. In each submarket, optimal contracts maximize expected borrower util-
ity Uu, given in (2) subject to (1).
EQUILIBRIUM I. The full information equilibrium is characterized by
(3a) p) = 1, / = 1, 2, (no rationing)
(3b) c) = 0, / = 1, 2, (no collateral)
and
(3c) r) = -, / = 1,2.
With full information, all borrowers receive loans. In addition, since bor-
rowers are indifferent between committing to a dollar of expected interest pay-
ments and a dollar of expected collateral, while lenders prefer the former,
equilibrium involves complete elimination of collateral. Formally, from (1),
the slope of isoprofit curves is47 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
dct *, ' '
while the marginal rate of substitution for borrowers of type / is
dr\ = -(1 - 7T,.)
dct ir,.
Indifference curves (U\ and U2) and zero-profit curves (ll and I2) for each
group are shown in figure 2.1 below. For each group, P < 1 implies that the
isoprofit curve is flatter than the indifference curve. Curves for high-risk bor-
rowers are steeper than those for low-risk borrowers. The full information
equilibrium is given by contracts af and a2, along with p) = 1.
Substituting (3a)-(3c) into (2) yields
(4) Uu = IT,./?,. - p - Z, i = 1,2.
Since p + Z is the social opportunity cost of investment, (4) shows that in-
vestments are made (Uu > 0) if and only if the expected total return exceeds
the expected social cost. Therefore, equilibrium is efficient.
2.3 Asymmetric Information and Unconstrained Collateral
2.3.1 Private Equilibrium
When individual investors' types are private information, lenders must de-
sign sets of loan contracts that generate self-selection of each borrower type
into the appropriate contract. Thus, lenders operate subject to (1) and a pair
of incentive-compatibility constraints:
(5a) Un > Ul2,
and
(5b) U22 > U2l,
where Utj is defined in (2). It can be directly verified that the full information
equilibrium is not incentive compatible because both types would prefer the
low-risk contract.
Instead, with asymmetric information, collateral is used as a sorting de-
vice.
7 High-risk borrowers have a stronger preference not to post collateral
because they have a larger probability of having to pay it.
Whether collateral can induce complete separation depends crucially on W,
the level of borrower wealth. This section examines equilibria and govern-
ment policy when borrower wealth is sufficiently large to allow complete
separation. Section 2.4 examines markets characterized by insufficient
wealth.48 William G. Gale
EQUILIBRIUM II. When borrower type is private information, and bor-
rower wealth is sufficiently large, equilibrium is characterized by:
8
(6a) p* = 1, p\ = 1,
(6b) c? = ^ _ ^ I g _ ^)p, cJ = O,
P ^ — *^i P
v




With imperfect information, high-risk borrowers obtain the same loan con-
tract, and therefore the same utility, as in the full information equilibrium.
Low-risk borrowers are not rationed, but their loan terms have changed. Spe-
cifically, low-risk borrowers indicate their type by posting collateral. In re-
turn, they pay a lower interest rate than in the full information equilibrium.
Substituting (6a)-(6c) into (2) for type 1 's yields
(7) l/° = IT,*, - p - Z - (1 - ir,)(l - (3)c».
Comparing (4) and (7), low-risk borrowers are worse off relative to the full
information equilibrium by (1 - iTjXl - (3)c
I1
I. The magnitude of the welfare
loss increases with cx.
The equilibrium with asymmetric information and unconstrained collateral
is shown in figure 2.1 as (an a2). High risks obtain a2, as before. However,
any contract offered to low risks must be incentive compatible with a2. Of all
such contracts, a, is the most desirable contract for type l's that also earns
nonnegative profits when extended to type l's. The reduction in low-risk bor-
rowers' utility to U
1! from U\ is shown by the shift from af to a,. Note that
(5b) is binding in this equilibrium.
2.3.2 Government Credit
Although there is no rationing in the above model, there is still a role for
government policy due to the efficiency losses created by the use of collateral.
Because all investors receive loans in the private equilibrium, it seems natural
to focus on loan guarantees (rather than direct loans) in this context.
9
Loan guarantees ensure the lender of receiving an amount 7., where 0 < 7.
^ p. The government can set 7, = 72 = 7, or choose the 7, separately. In
return for the guarantee, the lender passes on any collateral collected to the
government. The net cost to the government of a defaulted loan is 7, — fief
1,
where cf
l is the collateral requirement in the presence of the guarantee and is
discussed further below. The government is subject to the same information
constraints that private lenders face.
With the guarantees in place, expected borrower utility is still given by (2),
but the zero-profit condition for lenders is now given by49 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
Fig. 2.1 Equilibrium with unconstrained collateral
(8) P
 = / = 1,2.
EQUILIBRIUM III. When borrower type is private information and W
C
1/, equilibrium with loan guarantees is characterized by
(9a) pf = 1,







In the preceding private Equilibrium II, banks received (3c
1/ and 0 in collateral
on loans to type 1 and 2 borrowers, respectively. It is easy to verify that if 7,
= fte
1/ and 72 = 0, (9a)-(9c) reduce to the private equilibrium (6a)-(6c).
Only higher guarantee rates have real effects.
Using (9b), increases in 7l cause c
1/
1 to rise in equilibrium. This result is
contrary to standard intuition, which would suggest that as yl rises, the nec-
essary collateral should fall. However, as 7, rises, rx falls and the low-risk
contract becomes more desirable to high-risk borrowers. Since (5b) binds, c,
must rise to eliminate the possibility of having high risks masquerade as low
risks.
This situation is depicted in figure 2.2. Increases in 7, shift the zero-profit
line for low-risk lending from I, to I[. Equilibrium contracts, which are con-50 William G. Gale
Fig. 2.2 Guarantees to low-risk borrowers
strained by (5a) and (5b), shift from (ap a2) to (a|, a2). The collateral re-
quired at a| is greater than that required at av Therefore, the existence of
imperfect information reverses the usual intuition concerning the effect of yl
oncr
Any guarantee to low risks that reduced the collateral requirement would
make them worse off and thus would be rejected in favor of av This is illus-
trated by a guarantee that shifts the zero-profit curve to I" from IJ and the low-
risk contract to a". It is easy to show that all such guarantees correspond to
i, < Pcy.
Similar arguments show that c
1/
1 falls with increases in 72. As shown in
figure 2.3, a rise in 72 shifts the zero-profit line for lending to high-risk bor-
rowers from I2 to I'2, which raises low-risk utility to U2 from U2. The equilib-
rium thus shifts from (a,, a2) to (af, af). At the latter points, both groups are
better off and the collateral requirement has fallen.
Since the use of collateral creates efficiency losses, these results will have




(11) - p - Z + (1 - IT2)7251 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
Increases in 7, raise Uu, even though they also raise cv For any yx > (3c
1,
1,
low-risk borrowers are better off than in private equilibrium. Increases in y2
raise both Un and U22. Thus, both types of borrowers are better off with guar-
antees.
Welfare calculations are based on total expected borrowers' utility minus
expected government costs of funding the guarantees. Define overall wel-
fare as
(12) V = <pl/n + (1 - cp)£/22 - <p(l - irI)(7, - to)
- (1 - 9)(1 - TT2)(72 - to)-
The first two terms represent utility of each borrower type, weighted by their
population proportion; the last two terms represent net expected government
costs of providing guarantees to low risks and high risks, respectively.
1
0
PROPOSITION 1. When borrower type is private information, and W > c",







Fig. 2.3 Guarantees to high-risk borrowers52 William G. Gale
The main result from proposition 1 is that the effects of government inter-
vention depend on how the incentive-compatibility constraint, and in particu-
lar the collateral requirement, is affected.
Equation (13) states that increases in 7,, holding y2 constant, reduce wel-
fare. From (10), the guarantee raises Un by [(1 -
 #ir1)(
/ir1 - TT2)]/[TT1(1 -
ir2)]. However, from (12), the marginal cost, per low-risk borrower, of raising
7, is (1 — ir,). It is easy to show that the marginal costs exceed the marginal
benefits. This occurs because the rise in 7, raises c,, which creates an effi-
ciency loss.
The second result states that subsidizing the high-risk group is welfare im-
proving. Using (11) and (12), the government's costs equal the benefits to
high-risk borrowers. Since low-risk borrowers are also made better off, there
is a welfare gain. The rise in y2 increases the attractiveness of the high-risk
contract, so that low-risk borrowers can be offered more attractive terms. The
fall in cx allows for an efficiency gain.
Equation (15) states that raising the guarantee rate on all loans is welfare
improving. From (9b), setting 7, = 72 = 7 yields c
l*
l/dy < 0, so that collat-
eral falls as the overall guarantee rate rises. Therefore, the net effect of univer-
sal guarantees is to weaken the incentive-compatibility constraint and raise
welfare.
2.4 Asymmetric Information and Constrained Collateral
2.4.1 Private Equilibrium
The effectiveness of collateral as a sorting device is crucially dependent on
the existence of sufficient end-of-period borrower wealth. For example, if W
= 0, collateral cannot be used as a sorting device. More generally, suppose
W < c
1,
1, given in (6b); then the low-risk contract offered in Equilibrium II
cannot be fulfilled by borrowers. Lenders, knowing this, will not offer the
contract. Moreover, because (5b) is binding in equilibrium, if lenders simply
reduced c, to W, the contracts offered would not be incentive compatible; both
groups would prefer the contract meant for low-risk borrowers.
Lenders can resolve this problem by making the low-risk contract less at-
tractive to high-risk borrowers.
1
1 Raising rl would discourage low-risk bor-
rowers more than high-risk borrowers, since the latter have a smaller proba-
bility of actually having to pay the higher rate. The only alternative is to
reducepr This adjustment will discourage high-risks more and restore incen-
tive compatibility. Therefore, when borrower wealth is insufficient to permit
collateral alone to act as a sorting device, rationing of low-risk borrowers
(/?! < 1) is required to restore equilibrium. The intuition presented above is
summarized in
EQUILIBRIUM IV. When borrower type is characterized by private infor-
mation and W < c
ll, the private equilibrium is characterized by
1



















High-risk borrowers receive the same contract and utility as in Equilibrium II,
when W > c\. In contrast, because they cannot post c
1,
1 in collateral, low-risk
borrowers are rationed. Their expected utility is given by
(17) U% = pYfrA - P - Z - (1 - ir.Kl - P)W].
2.4.2 Government Credit
In the presence of rationing, the natural government policy to analyze is
characterized by pG, the probability of obtaining a government-guaranteed
loan given (1) the borrower cannot obtain private credit and (2) -y,, de-
fined as before. Although the analysis will focus on subsidized loan guaran-
tees, analogous results can be shown to hold for subsidized direct loans as
well.
The interest rate charged on guaranteed loans gives lenders zero profits and
is given by




It is assumed that government charges W as collateral.
1
3
With this policy, low-risk utility is given by
1
4
(19) Un = PlXn + (1 - Px)pGXlG.
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) represents the probability of ob-
taining a private loan, pG, multiplied by Xu, the expected payoff to low-risk
borrowers of obtaining a private loan meant for low-risk borrowers. The sec-
ond term represents the probability of obtaining a government-guaranteed
loan, (1 — Pi)pG, multiplied by X1G, the expected payoff to low-risk borrowers
from that loan. If 7, = (3vv, then Xn = XXG and there is no gain to obtaining a
government rather than a private loan. If 7, > (3W, Xn > XlG.
The incentive compatibility constraint (5b) is now given by
(20) U22>PlX2l + (1 -Pl)pGX2G,
where X2l is the expected payoff to high risks of taking a private loan meant
for low risks, and X2G is the expected payoff to high risks of taking a govern-
ment loan meant for low-risks. (These are given in more detail in the proofs
of Propositions 2 and 3 in the Appendix.)
EQUILIBRIUM V. When borrower type is private information, and W < c
1/,




(21b) cy = W, c\ = 0,
(21c) rv = -P- _
 l ~
 1T
l pw, r^ = —.
These private loans are, of course, supplemented by government-guaranteed
loans to some low-risk borrowers described by (pG, rG, W). High-risk borrow-
ers obtain the same contract and utility as in Equilibria II and IV. Low-risk
utility is given by (19) with appropriate substitutions forXn andX1G.
Define the probability of low risks obtaining any loan as
(22) p*=Pl + (l- Pl)pG.
Then a proportion 1 — p* of low risks will be rationed.
PROPOSITION 2. When the initial allocation is given by Equilibrium V,
increases in/?G or 7, increase the extent of rationing (reduce/?*).
Proposition 2 establishes that government subsidies to borrowers who can-
not obtain private financing increases the number of borrowers who cannot
obtain any financing, public or private. That is, private credit is crowded out
on a more than one-to-one basis. Although this result may appear surprising,
it is based on the equilibrium response of lenders to the shift in the incentive-
compatibility constraint.
For example, in the equilibrium with W > c
lx
l, an increase in 7, raised cx in
order to restore incentive compatibility. Now, however, collateral is con-
strained to equal W, which is assumed to be less than c
1/. As a consequence,
increases in 7, (which reduce r,) require thatpx fall. From (22), a reduction in
px, holding pG constant, reduces p*. Therefore, raising the guarantee rate to
low-risk borrowers increases the extent of rationing.
Similarly, consider a small increase in/?G, holding 7j constant. If/?, were
held constant, all borrowers would have an increased chance of obtaining a
cheap government loan, which would induce high risks to masquerade as low
risks. If px fell such that/?* were unchanged from its previous level, high risks
would still prefer masquerading as low risks to taking the high-risk contract.
To show this, rewrite (20) as
(23) U22 > p*X2x + (1 - Px)pG(X2G - X2X).
Recall that this constraint is binding in Equilibrium V. If pG rises and p* is
held constant, (23) is violated. Therefore, in equilibrium, incentive compati-
bility requires px to fall enough to make p* fall in response to the rise in pG.
That is, increases in/?G raise the extent of rationing.
Although they increase the likelihood of any given low-risk borrower being
rationed, guarantees raise the ex post utility of those who do obtain govern-
ment credit; this is caused by the reduced interest rate rG on guaranteed loans.55 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
The effects of these guarantees on the ex ante expected utility of low-risk
borrowers and on welfare is given in
PROPOSITION 3. When the initial allocation is given by Equilibrium V, the
welfare effects of government intervention are
(24a) ^ > 0,
(24b) ^ > 0,
(25a) ~ < 0,
(25b) — < 0.
dpG
Equations (24a) and (24b) show that guaranteed loans raise the ex ante ex-
pected utility of the targeted group. This occurs even though the overall prob-
ability of obtaining a loan falls. Therefore, the targeted group prefers to have
the policy, even though fewer lower-risk borrowers obtain credit when the
subsidy is in place.
Equations (25a) and (25b) show that, as in Proposition 1, guarantees to
low-risk borrowers reduce overall welfare. This occurs because the increase
in rationing represents an overall efficiency loss. Following the approach
taken in Section 2.3 it is straightforward to show that guarantees to the high-
risk group reduce the extent of rationing. Intuitively, these guarantees make
the high-risk contract (U22) more attractive and, through (21a), raise yv Be-
cause of the reduction in rationing, these guarantees raise efficiency.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the effects of credit subsidies in markets characterized
by adverse selection. The principal result is that the effects of credit subsidies
depend on how eligibility is determined. Programs that subsidize the unra-
tioned contract will reduce the extent of rationing and raise overall efficiency.
In contrast, programs that target borrowers who cannot obtain private financ-
ing raise the extent of rationing and reduce efficiency. The distinction is im-
portant precisely because most government credit is designed to provide funds
to those who do not receive private loans. In the model presented here, such
policies raise the extent of rationing and create inherent tradeoffs among mem-
bers of the same target group: fewer of them obtain any type of credit, but
those that receive government loans are better off.
Two concluding comments should be made. First, the effects described
above represent equilibrium responses. In particular, they take into account
the need to deter high risks from pretending to be low risks. As a consequence56 William G. Gale
of this incentive-compatibility constraint, whenever the government eases
some of the terms on low-risk contracts, the others must be adversely affected
in equilibrium.
Second, the paper has focused on a fairly standard adverse selection model,
based on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Numerous extensions of that and
other models have shown that the nature of equilibrium can be affected by
incentive effects (Stiglitz and Weiss 1986), project characteristics, the set of
available financial instruments (de Meza and Webb 1987), alternative projects
(Chan and Thakor 1987), information sharing (Yotsuzuka 1987), the shape of
the production function (Milde and Riley 1988), and other characteristics.
The effects of credit policies in such alternative models deserve further explo-
ration.
Appendix
EQUILIBRIUM I. In each submarket, equilibrium contracts maximize ex-
pected borrower utility, Uu, given in (2) subject to (1). Substitution of (1) into
(2) for each Un yields
maxL
1 = A.[ir,./?, - p - Z - (1 - ir,)(l - p,)c,].
Taking derivatives yields:
^ TT,)(1 - P,) < 0,
so that c) = 0, which implies through (1) that r) = p/ir.. In addition,
dU
dPi
= ir,fl, - p - Z,
c
1 = 0
which is positive if type i investors are applying for loans, implying that
Pf = 1-
EQUILIBRIUM II. The remaining equilibria follow a common pattern.
Therefore, Equilibrium II is derived in some detail, while the derivations of
Equilibria III-V are shorter.
With asymmetric information, equilibrium is obtained by maximizing the
population-weighted average of borrowers' expected utility, given by
(Al) cpUn + (1 - cp)U22,
subject to (1), (5a), and (5b). Following Besanko and Thakor (1987), the
strategy employed is initially to ignore (5a) and assume pt =• 1. Later it will57 Government Intervention in Credit Markets
be shown that the optimal solution does satisfy (5a) and /?,. = 1. Substituting
(1) into (Al) and maximizing (Al) subject to (5b) yields the problem:
maxL" = <p/>,K*, - p - Z - (1 - ir.Xl - P)c,]
(A2) + (1 ~ <P)P2(Tr2R2 - p - Z - (1 - TT2)(1 - P)c2
*2R2 ~ P ~ Z - (1 - <TT2)(1 - P)CJ
IT, IT,
cx - Z]},
where \ is the LaGrange multiplier associated with (5b). Setting/?, = 1 and
setting dL
u/dc1 = 0 implies
<p(l -ir.Xl - P)TT,




; ' > 0,
17,(1 - 7T2) ~ TT2(1 - 1T,)P
which implies that (5b) is binding. Using (A3), it is easy to show that dDVdc2
< 0, which implies c\
l = 0. Substituting for c\
l in (5b) and solving (5b) for
c
1,
1 yields the expression in (6b). Given cf, rfcan be found using (1).
It remains to be shown that (5a) is satisfied at the solution presented above
and that/?, = 1 is optimal. To show that (5a) is satisfied, note that Un ^ Un
if
(A4) iTi(*i - '?) " (1 " *iK ^ TTiC^! " r°), or
Tr^r" - r») > (1 - ir.y".
Using (1) and (6b) and some algebra, it can be shown that (A4) holds for the
values given in proposition 2 above. By examining figure 2.1, Uu > Ui2 can
also be seen.
It is also straightforward to show that dL
n/dp2 > 0, which implies/?!,
1 = 1.
Finally,
^ = (pK*. - p - Z - (1 - 1^(1 - P)c«]
(A5)
 dPi
A _ ^p _ ^0 orj ,2(l ^l)P _ J
This can be shown to be positive provided that k — r, — Z > 0. This condi-
tion captures the idea that high risks have a higher aversion to posting collat-
eral because they have a larger probability of having to pay it. That is, the
same condition implies, from (2), that del dp rises with IT.
EQUILIBRIUM III. Guarantees shift the zero-profit condition to (8) from
(1). Otherwise, the maximization follows as in Equilibrium II. That is, substi-
tute (8) into (2) for (Al) and maximize subject to (5a), ignoring (5b) and
setting p, = 1 for now. The problem is to58 William G. Gale
max L
m = cpp.K*, - p - Z + (1 - ir1)(71 - c,)]
T2/?2 ~ P - Z + (1 ~ 1T2)(72 - C2)]
k{p2[TT2R2 - p ~ Z + (1 " 7T2)(72 " C2)]
2 ^ yi ( ^ )}
Setting dL
m/dcl = 0 implies that X > 0, which implies that (5b) binds. Given
X. > 0, it is easy to show that c™ = 0. Solving (5b) for c
1/
1 yields the expres-
sion in (9b). Showing that (5a) is satisfied and that/??
1
1 = 1 follow in the same
way as Equilibrium II.
PROPOSITION 1. Expected borrower utilities are given in (10) and (11).
The government cost of providing guarantee 7, is (1 — ir,)(7, — fJc|
n) for
each borrower in group i. The effects of raising yx only or 72 only are de-
scribed in the text. The effects of raising 7 are as follows.
If 7 < (3c
1/, the only effect of raising 7 occurs through raising 72, so the
increase in 7 is welfare improving. When 7 ^ (3c
1/, further increases intro-
duce opposing welfare effects. However, the net effect is always welfare im-
proving. Note that, for each high-risk borrower, the benefits of raising 7 equal
(1 — TT2)872, which equals the cost of providing guarantees for high-risk bor-
rowers. The welfare effects thus depend on comparing dU^/dy and the cost of
providing guarantees to low risks, (1 - TT,). From (10),
'Ill ^ 1 'li 2/
Therefore, increases in 7 are welfare-improving.
EQUILIBRIUM IV. The problem is now to maximize (A2) subject to (1),
(5b), and a wealth constraint, W < c
1/. As before, taking derivatives with
respect to c2 and p2 yields p\
y = 1 and c2
v = 0, and the latter result implies
r\
w = p/ir2. The wealth constraint implies that c™ = W. The zero-profits con-
dition determines r
iy- Only px remains to be determined. Optimizing with
respect to px implies that X > 0 so that (5b) is binding. Solving (5b) for px
yields the expression in (16a).
EQUILIBRIUM V. The problem is now to maximize (A2) subject to (1),
(5a), W < c







s derived as in Equilibrium IV. The equilibrium px is
determined by solving (20) for/?,.
PROPOSITION 2. Note that X2X = TT2R2 — TT2p/ir, - {ir^l - ir2) - TT2(1 - TTJP/TTJW - Z, and X2G = X2X + {TT2(1 - TT1)/ir1}(71 - pW), where these terms are derived by substituting for r using (1) and (18). Thus Xxx and









 2' (1 - PG) < 0'
07 07 '
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because from (21a), U22 < X2V Similarly
dp* dp (U22 - X2l)(X2G -X2l
— = — (1 - pG) + (l ~ Pi) = —7^ r2—
dpG dpG (X2l - pGx2G)
2
using (21a) and some algebra.
PROPOSITION 3. Taking derivatives of (19) yields
(A6)
using (21a). The expression in brackets can be shown to be positive, so that
(A6) is positive. In addition,
~^~ - ^~~ (*n ~ PG




because the term in brackets can be shown to be positive.
To show the welfare effects of changing 7,, note that the expresion in (A6)
is less than (1 -ir^, the marginal costs of raising 7j per low-risk borrower.
Thus, increases in 7j reduce efficiency. Similar results hold forpG.
Notes
1. For discussions of the features and overall effects of federal credit, see Bosworth,
Carron, and Rhyne (1987), Gale (1988a), or Office of Management and Budget
(1989).
2. Previous research on federal credit in markets with imperfect information in-
cludes Mankiw (1986) and Gale (1988b), who study models with a continuum of bor-
rower types, and Gale (1987) and Smith and Stutzer (1989) who examine models with
two types of borrowers. The current paper is based on Gale (1987, app. C). Some of
the results are closely related to independent work by Smith and Stutzer (1989).
3. As described in Section 2.4 below, raising the interest rate on the low-risk loan
cannot restore incentive compatibility, because low risks are more averse to accepting
a higher interest rate than high risks are.
4. The initial endowment could also represent a unit of labor supply, in which case
Z would be interpretable as the value of leisure forgone by investing.
5. See Barro (1976), Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985), and Williamson
(1987).
6. In order to focus on the role of collateral and rationing as sorting devices, the
paper focuses on separating equilibria. See nn. 8 and 13 below for a discussion of
potential pooling equilibria.60 WUliam G. Gale
7. Besanko and Thakor (1987), Bester (1985), Chan and Thakor (1987), Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981, 1986) and Wette (1983) analyze the selection effects induced by
collateral.
8. The existence of a separating equilibrium can be ensured by assuming that there
is a sufficiently large proportion of high-risk borrowers or that the difference between
IT, — TT2 is large enough. See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) or Besanko and Thakor
(1987). There are no pooling equilibria under the assumptions in this section.
9. Gale (1987) also examines government policies in which low-risk loans are taxed
and high-risk loans are subsidized. These policies operate through the same channels
as guarantees and will be ignored here.
10. Therefore, the welfare criterion is total surplus, rather than a Pareto measure.
In addition, (12) assumes that taxes are raised in a lump-sum manner.
11. It is impossible to make the high-risk contract more attractive to high-risk bor-
rowers without losing money on high-risk contracts. Because of the Nash assumption,
cross-subsidization of contracts will not occur in this model, although it could in other
contexts. See Stiglitz and Weiss (1989).
12. Besanko and Thakor (1987) show that, under these circumstances, (5a) requires
that W S: Zp (IT, — TT2)/{TT1(TT2/? — p) — ZTT2[(1 — TTJ) + PIT,]}. Loosely speaking, this requires that Z is small relative to W. In order to rule out a pooling equilibrium at
P, = 1, c,. = W, it if necessary to assume that (3 < [TT*(1 - ir^l/tir^l — IT*)], where
ir* = ipiT, + (1 — (p)TT2. It may be thought that the allocation in Equilibrium V could
be broken by an offer that raises p{ and r,, holding c, at W. Such an offer would earn
positive profits if it attracted only low risks. However, from (2), drldp — {k — c — Z)l
pi: — (r — c)lp. Since this expression is decreasing in IT, any offer that raised/?, and
ry relative to Equilibrium V would attract both types and thus would not be offered.
13. Reducing the collateral requirement on government loans has the same qualita-
tive effects as raising pG or -y,.
14. In order to avoid the prospect of borrowers turning down private loans to accept
public ones, I assume Xu > PGXlc.
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